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Deliveries by commercial drones are no longer ideas one
would only expect to see in science-fiction movies. In August
2020, Amazon, one of the major logistics operators in the
United States, received approval from the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) to use drones for its delivery operators. De-
livery drones have become a reality in modern times. Since
2012, the FAA has promulgated regulations to respond to con-
tinuous innovations and developments in this area of technol-
ogy. In December 2020, the FAA issued its Final Rule to safely
expand the regular operation of drones at night or over people.
In 2019, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws proposed specific rules applicable to drones in
privacy laws. However, these different legal players have yet to
propose specific rules to address liability from negligent torts.
This Comment takes a deep dive into the law of negligence
and argues for enacting more specific drone laws addressing va-
rious questions relating to negligent tort lawsuits. The Comment
demonstrates that absent clearer guidance, the ordinary negli-
gence cause of action is insufficient in the context of personal
injury or property damage by commercial drones because the
injured parties will likely be unable to establish the requisite ele-
ments of duty and breach. Finally, this Comment recommends
different theories of liability as more viable options for injured
parties to seek compensation. As applied to commercial drones,
these other theories of liability better serve the primary purpose
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of tort law, provide uniformity in the law among different
courts, and reduce costs for involved parties.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ON AUGUST 31, 2020, Amazon received approval from theFederal Aviation Administration (FAA) to use drones1 for
its delivery operations.2 The approval allowed Amazon to begin
1 Drones and uncrewed aircraft are used interchangeably throughout this
Comment. DRONE ADVISORY COMM., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., PUBLIC EBOOK JUNE
23, 2021 DAC MEETING 104, 113 (2021), https://www.faa.gov/uas/pro-
grams_partnerships/drone_advisory_committee/media/
DAC_Public_eBook_06_23_2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C4G-3W5S]. At the
time this Comment was written, the FAA term in use was unmanned aircraft, with
a proposal to change the regulatory term to uncrewed aircraft. Id.
2 Güner Soysal, Amazon’s Next Potential Game Changer: Drone Deliveries, SEEKING
ALPHA (Sept. 13, 2020, 11:41 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4374000-
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drone deliveries in a limited setting, initially involving ten
houses.3 But Amazon is not the first logistics operator to obtain
such approval; both UPS Flight Forward (UPS) and Alphabet’s
Wing already received FAA approvals for their drone delivery
operations in 2019.4 UPS has since started transporting medical
samples to a hospital in North Carolina as its pilot program.5
This trend continued as Walmart joined the bandwagon to ex-
plore the area of drone deliveries in September 2020.6
The benefits of drone deliveries are obvious: reduction in de-
livery time and increased efficiency.7 As the shortest distance be-
tween two locations is a direct, straight line, “if [one] can take
[the] delivery out of the conventional vehicle route and serve it
by drone instead, then [one] save[s] a lot of money on the con-
ventional vehicle routes,” because it is less constrained and re-
quires fewer detours.8 Amazon claimed drones will be
indispensable in achieving its goal of thirty-minute delivery.9
Likewise, UPS’s pilot program, which delivers medical samples
from a doctor’s office to a testing lab, projects the transit time to
be less than five minutes.10 With “two of the largest logistics op-
erations in the country” investing their resources in drone deliv-
eries while also developing and perfecting the technology, it is




3 Matt Leonard, Amazon Prime Air Gets FAA Clearance for Drone Delivery on ‘Highly
Rural’ Test Range, SUPPLY CHAIN DIVE (Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.supplychain
dive.com/news/amazon-prime-air-faa-clearance-drone-delivery-rural-test-range/
584436/#:~:text=dive [https://perma.cc/C26A-FWJ5].
4 Id.; Annie Palmer, Amazon Wins FAA Approval for Prime Air Drone Delivery Fleet,
CNBC (Aug. 31, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/08/31/amazon-
prime-now-drone-delivery-fleet-gets-faa-approval.html [https://perma.cc/GDP7-
9B99].
5 Maggie Schneider Huston, The Sky Is the Limit for Medical Drones, UPS (Mar.
26, 2019), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sky-limit-medical-drones-maggie-
schneider-huston/ [https://perma.cc/TD62-KEZ6].
6 Tom Ward, Walmart Now Piloting On-Demand Drone Delivery with Flytrex,
WALMART (Sept. 9, 2020), https://corporate.walmart.com/newsroom/2020/09/
09/walmart-now-piloting-on-demand-drone-delivery-with-flytrex [https://
perma.cc/JYH5-3HWG].
7 See Leonard, supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Huston, supra note 5.
11 Leonard, supra note 3.
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Because of the increased prevalence of recreational or com-
mercial drones, several articles have been written addressing
people’s constitutional rights to privacy and implications on
landowners’ property and privacy rights, especially in the area of
trespass, nuisance, and intrusion on seclusion.12 However, pri-
vacy and property rights are not the only liabilities that may arise
from the increased use of commercial drones. As experts antici-
pate a rise in personal injury or property damage cases from
negligent drone operations, negligence is another area of law
that legislators and legal practitioners should turn to as ex-
perts.13 This Comment takes a deep dive into the law of negli-
gent torts and argues for enacting more specific drone laws
addressing various questions related to negligent tort suits. This
Comment demonstrates that absent clearer guidance, the ordi-
nary negligence cause of action is insufficient because the in-
jured parties will likely be unable to establish the required
elements of duty and breach. It explores different theories of
liability as more viable options under which injured parties
could seek compensation.
Part I introduces increasing trends in drone usage and antici-
pated increased uses by logistics operators. Part II then looks at
the current jurisprudence in the arena of commercial drones,
including available FAA rules, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws’ (NCCUSL) (also known as
the Uniform Law Commission or ULC) proposed Tort Law Re-
lating to the Drones Act, available state drone laws, and com-
mon law torts. Part III applies negligence tort theory to what
might become a typical personal injury or property damage case
once commercial drones are fully incorporated. Part III consid-
ers questions like who can be held liable for such harms, what
duty is owed, and how difficult it would be for the injured par-
ties to show breach if any. Part IV proposes some recommenda-
tions that legislatures or the NCCUSL should adopt and
alternative causes of action available for the injured parties.
12 See, e.g., Tyler Watson, Note, Maximizing the Value of America’s Newest Resource,
Low-Altitude Airspace: An Economic Analysis of Aerial Trespass and Drones, 95 IND. L.J.
1399, 1400–05, 1429 (2020); Thomas Carlton, Note, New Heights, New Uses, and
New Questions: Can Individuals Enforce Their Property Rights Against the Impending Rise
of Low-Flying Civilian Drones?, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2135, 2135, 2137 (2018); Jordan M.
Cash, Note, Droning On and On: A Tort Approach to Regulating Hobbyist Drones, 46 U.
MEM. L. REV. 695, 724–31 (2016).
13 See Vivek Sehrawat, Liability Issue of Domestic Drones, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH
TECH. L.J. 110, 116–19, 126–27 (2018) (finding that negligence law is applicable
to drone liability).
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Next, Part V considers currently available protections for logis-
tics operators against potential tort suits and resulting liabilities
(insurance coverage and 18 U.S.C. § 32(a)), and Part VI
concludes.
II. CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE IN THE ARENA OF
COMMERCIAL DRONES
This Section discusses the current jurisprudence affecting the
operations of commercial drones. First, the FAA’s role, purpose,
and regulations will be explored. Then the Section introduces
the NCCUSL’s proposed rules, briefly discusses the lack of state
drone laws governing liability, and presents relevant causes of
action under common law torts.
A. FAA REGULATIONS AND THEIR PURPOSE IN REGULATING
COMMERCIAL DRONES
The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 defines un-
crewed aircraft, or more commonly referred to as drones, as “an
aircraft that is operated without the possibility of direct human
intervention from within or on the aircraft.”14 The FAA is
charged with promoting safety by prescribing minimum stan-
dards for aircraft in U.S. air space.15 It states that its “mission is
to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the
world. . . . by ensuring that all those who utilize [United States’]
airspace operate safely and responsibly.”16 The existence of un-
crewed aircraft systems raises potential safety concerns for both
people on the ground and other aircraft.17 The FAA promul-
gated five operating standards to address the safety concerns:
(1) restricting operations over populated areas, (2) limiting use
around spectators until the aircraft was flight tested and proven
airworthy, (3) restricting operations to 400 feet, (4) using observ-
ers to assist operations, and (5) requiring devices to give right of
ways to [crewed] aircraft[ ] and avoiding flying near [crewed]
aircraft.18
14 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 331(8),
126 Stat. 11, 72 (2012) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44801(11)).
15 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a), (b).
16 National Drone Safety Awareness Week: Nov. 16–22, 2020, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.
(2020), https://www.faa.gov/uas/resources/events_calendar/drone_safety_a
wareness/media/DSAW_2020_guidebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/ME7J-MS8U].
17 See Jamie Busby, Drone Delivery: The Danger of Opening the Air as a Commercial
Highway, 18 LOY. MAR. L.J. 287, 290 (2019).
18 Id. (citation omitted).
440 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
In anticipation of more prevalent uses of commercial drones,
the FAA subsequently created new regulations regarding un-
crewed aircraft systems.19 Under Title 14 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (C.F.R.) Part 107, drones must be kept within the
pilot’s visual line of sight;20 flown at or below 400 feet above the
ground;21 cannot be flown at night unless the drone has anti-
collision lighting visible for “at least [three] statute miles;”22 and
cannot be flown over a human being unless that person is di-
rectly participating in the operation of the drone or located
under a covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle.23 Addi-
tionally, the total weight of the drone and cargo cannot exceed
fifty-five pounds.24 However, drone operators can request spe-
cific waivers from the FAA, which allow certain operations of
drones that usually fall outside of the regulations.25 For instance,
an operator can seek a waiver to allow remote pilots to fly their
drones beyond the visual line of sight.26
On December 28, 2020, the FAA issued additional drone
rules—also known as the Final Rule—to “address safety, security
and privacy concerns while advancing opportunities for innova-
tion and utilization of drone technology.”27 The purpose of the
Final Rule is to amend 14 C.F.R. Part 107 “by permitting the
routine operation of small [uncrewed aircraft systems] at night
or over people under certain conditions” without separate
waiver requests.28 It creates four operational categories with dif-
ferent safety requirements, like limits on weight and potential
19 See id. at 291.
20 14 C.F.R. § 107.31 (2021).
21 Id. § 107.51(b).
22 Id. § 107.29(a)(2).
23 Id. §107.39(a)–(b).
24 See id. § 107.3.
25 Part 107 Waiver, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/commer-
cial_operators/part_107_waivers [https://perma.cc/CF36-ZVEE] (Apr. 19, 2021,
10:27 AM).




27 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., U.S. Department of Transportation Is-
sues Two Much-Anticipated Drone Rules to Advance Safety and Innovation in the
United States (Dec. 28, 2020), https://www.faa.gov/news/press_releases/
news_story.cfm?newsId=25541 [https://perma.cc/9LT6-CNAL].
28 Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People, 86 Fed. Reg.
4314, 4314 (Jan. 15, 2021) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 11, 21, 43, 107) [here-
inafter Final Rule].
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for severe injury.29 Depending on the category, the Final Rule
requires remote-identification technology, which “provides
identification of drones in flight as well as the location of their
control stations.”30 This requirement allows law enforcement of-
ficials to be more aware of airspace and “reduces the risk of
drone interference with other aircraft[s] and people or property
on the ground.”31 The Final Rule also requires pilots to keep
their remote pilot certificate and identification on their person
when operating a drone to present such information to authori-
ties when requested.32 The Final Rule also allows the operation
of drones at night in limited areas.33 However, “the FAA [cur-
rently] does not have any laws governing the liability that may
result from the operation of drones.”34 The Final Rule briefly
mentions that the FAA recognized the liability and privacy con-
cerns but then states that the agency has no authority to man-
date liability insurance purchases or “impose regulations based
on privacy concerns.”35 Rather, it emphasizes that the operators
should comply with existing, applicable laws or regulations.36
B. STATE DRONE LAWS AND TORT LAW RELATED TO THE
DRONES ACT
In 2013, thirty states tried to pass regulations against the com-
mercial use of drones, but none of these laws addressed liabil-
ity.37 Because specific state drone laws were lacking, the
NCCUSL introduced the Tort Law Relating to Drones Act Com-
mittee in November 2017, and the Drafting Committee pub-
lished its first draft in December 2017.38 The NCCUSL’s Tort
Law Relating to Drones Act (Drones Act) seeks to establish
model rules for addressing potential liabilities arising from tres-
pass by drones, violations of privacy by drones, and negligent
29 See id. at 4315–17.




34 Sehrawat, supra note 13, at 121.
35 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 4365.
36 Id.
37 Sehrawat, supra note 13, at 121–22.
38 See Vic Moss, ULC Updates Tort Law Relating to Drones Act, DRONE U (June 10,
2019), https://www.thedroneu.com/blog/ulc-tort-law-drone-privacy-rights/
[https://perma.cc/7GQL-D5PL].
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operations of drones.39 However, the Drones Act focuses on the
first two torts and only has a general statement for the latter.40
Regarding negligence, the Drones Act only states that “except as
provided for in this [Drones Act], and subject to any
[c]onstitutional rights or privileges, the common law and statu-
tory tort law of [a] state shall apply to a person who owns or
operates [uncrewed] aircraft within [the] state . . . .”41 It is wor-
thy to note that in its March 2019 draft, the NCCUSL had in-
cluded a separate (albeit brief) section on the “Negligent
Operation of an Unmanned Aircraft.”42 This section states that,
(a) An operator acts negligently if the operator does not exercise
reasonable care under all of the circumstances. (b) The standard
of care against which an operator of an [uncrewed] aircraft shall
be judged is the standard of care of a similarly situated operator
of an [uncrewed] aircraft, including whether the operator is a
commercial or hobbyist operator and whether the operator is re-
quired by the Federal Aviation Administration or other authority
to hold a license for the operation of the [uncrewed] aircraft.43
C. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY TORT LAWS
Without specific drone laws addressing potential liabilities
that may arise from malfunctions or improper operations of
drones, both injured and injuring parties will need to turn to
the common law and statutory tort law of a forum state.44 When
a person is physically injured, or a product damages their prop-
erty, the person has the following causes of action available: neg-
ligence, strict liability, products liability,45 negligence per se, or
39 See Brian Wynne & Gary Shapiro, New Approach to State Drone Laws Balances
Privacy and Innovation, TECHCRUNCH (July 3, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://tech-
crunch.com/2019/07/03/new-approach-to-state-drone-laws-balances-privacy-
and-innovation/ [https://perma.cc/NA45-SP8B].
40 See generally UNIF. TORT L. RELATING TO DRONES ACT prefatory note (UNIF. L.
COMM’N, Draft May 30, 2019) (stating the Act analyzes tort law in trespass to land
and privacy as they are “[t]he two most contentious areas of [t]ort [l]aw
[r]elating to [d]rones”).
41 Id. § 4(b).
42 TORT L. RELATING TO DRONES ACT § 9 (UNIF. L. COMM’N., Draft Feb. 19,
2019).
43 Id.
44 See, e.g., UNIF. TORT L. RELATING TO DRONES ACT § 4(b).
45 Because products liability can be based on negligence, strict liability, or con-
tract law under the breach of implied warranty of merchantability, this cause of
action is considered separately. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB.
§ 2 cmt. N. (AM. L. INST. 1998).
2021] DELIVERY DRONES: INAPT FOR APPLICATION 443
breach of implied warranty of merchantability.46 Because this
Comment focuses on applying existing tort laws on liabilities
stemming from the operation of commercial drones, the last
cause of action (breach of implied warranty of merchantability)
is not considered.
Negligence theory “considers the reasonableness of the [in-
juring party]’s actions,” whereas strict liability theory assigns lia-
bility to the injuring party regardless of fault.47 Products liability
subjects sellers or distributors of a defective product to liability
for the harm it causes to persons or property.48 Lastly, the negli-
gence per se doctrine renders an action negligent if the injuring
party violates a safety statute without a valid excuse.49 In the next
Section, the current jurisprudence of negligence tort theory is
discussed and applied to potential accidents arising from drone
deliveries.
III. NEGLIGENCE TORT THEORY AND ITS APPLICATION
This Section discusses each element of negligence, empha-
sizes the lack of current case law related to commercial drones,
then applies the first two elements of negligence in the context
of commercial drones. The analysis demonstrates that the ordi-
nary negligence cause of action is insufficient absent clearer gui-
dance from the NCCUSL or the legislatures because the injured
parties are unlikely to establish the duty and breach elements.
A. NEGLIGENCE
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, an injured party
must show the following: (1) the injuring party owed a duty of
care to the injured party; (2) such duty was breached by the
injuring party; (3) the breach was the actual and proximate
cause of the injury; and (4) there was an injury, resulting in
damages.50
46 See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between Auton-
omous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1323 (2012);
Jacob B. Jensen, Note, Self-Driving but Not Self-Regulating: The Development of a Legal
Framework to Promote the Safety of Autonomous Vehicles, 57 WASHBURN L.J. 579, 590
(2018).
47 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 46, at 1323.
48 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
49 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 14 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
50 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1965); cf.
id. §§ 430–31.
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Generally, the injuring person’s duty is to exercise ordinary,
reasonable care to the injured person.51 The Third Restatement
of Torts states that “[a] person acts negligently if the person
does not exercise reasonable care under all the circum-
stances.”52 However, an injuring party may owe a higher stan-
dard of care when that party “engages in a business, occupation,
or profession [that] must exercise the requisite degree of learn-
ing, skill, and ability of that calling with reasonable and ordinary
care.”53 For example, the standard of care required of a pilot is
that of what an ordinary prudent pilot would do in the same or
similar circumstances, not what an ordinary prudent person
would do.54
To determine whether the injuring party breached a duty
owed to the injured party, courts have applied Judge Learned
Hand’s formula: B<PL.55 The injuring party would be liable if
B<PL, where B is the burden of having adequate precautions, P
is the probability of the harm occurring, and L is the gravity of
the resulting injury.56 In other words, there must be a balance
between the burden and the magnitude of the risk.57 The Sec-
ond Restatement of Torts similarly compares the magnitude of
the risks and utility of the act to assess whether the act is
negligent.58
For the causation element, the injured party must show the
existence of both actual and proximate causation.59 The injured
party must establish that the injuring party’s action actually
51 See, e.g., Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (Mass. 1850) (using
the term “ordinary care” as the standard for negligence); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (AM. L. INST.
2010) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the ac-
tor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”).
52 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3
(AM. L. INST. 2010).
53 Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (listing
other professionals such as fire sprinkler contractors, industrial designers, physi-
cians, and attorneys).
54 See id.
55 See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Judge Hand introducing the formula to a barge-steamship accident); see, e.g.,
Washington v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 555 So. 2d 1350, 1353–55 (La. 1990)
(applying the formula to a power line accident).
56 Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
57 See id. (stating that the adequate precautions that need to be taken depend
on the place and time).
58 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
59 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 6
cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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caused the harm and that there is also a sufficient relationship
between the negligent act and the harm.60 Typically, the “but
for” test is used to determine actual causation, which asks
whether the injury would have resulted but for the negligent
act.61 If there are multiple tortfeasors or causes for the injury,
different tests are applied to show actual causation existed.62
Proximate causation is also required to limit the scope of liabil-
ity when the relationship between the injuring party’s negligent
conduct and the harm is too tenuous.63 Foreseeability is the
touchstone in determining the existence of proximate causa-
tion.64 The essential idea is that a negligent actor should not be
liable for every possible harmful effect of his conduct, but only
for those harms that a reasonable person in the actor’s position
should have been able to foresee arising from that conduct.65
Although foreseeability is arguably the most common ap-
proach, there are other approaches. The Second Restatement of
Torts requires two parts for negligent conduct to be a legal
cause of harm: (1) the act is a substantial factor in bringing
about the harm, and (2) that no rule of law exists to relieve the
actor from liability.66 In comparison, the Third Restatement of
Torts states that “[a]n actor is not liable for harm when the tor-
tious aspect of the actor’s conduct was of a type that does not
generally increase the risk of that harm.”67 Although articulated
in different ways, each approach shares the same principle that
proximate causation is required to limit the scope of liability
based on actual causation.
60 See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Cause
in fact . . . [means] the negligent act or omission was a substantial factor in bring-
ing about the injury[.]”).
61 See id. (“[‘But for cause’ means] without which no harm would have been
incurred.”).
62 Different tests include the concurrent causes test, substantial factor test, and
alternative causes doctrine, among others. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Causation Actu-
ally, 51 GA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016).
63 See, e.g., Gutierrez, 106 F.3d at 687–88 (rejecting circumstantial evidence as
sufficient to prove causation).
64 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (im-
plying that the defendant should not be held liable if he was not aware of the
possibilities of danger).
65 See id.
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (AM. L. INST. 1965). Section 433 lists
factors to determine whether the negligent act was a substantial factor in produc-
ing the harm. Id. § 433.
67 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 30 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
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Lastly, a person must have sustained actual loss or damages
due to the injuring party’s conduct.68 This element would likely
not be hard for the injured party to establish because the in-
jured party’s claim would arise from either their property being
damaged by negligent drone delivery operations or their person
being physically, mentally, or emotionally harmed by negligent
drone delivery operations.
B. LACK OF CASE LAW RELATING TO COMMERCIAL DRONES
Although delivery by drones is highly anticipated and ex-
pected to be widely commercialized in the near future, there are
no cases involving personal injury or property damage from
drone deliveries because it is not extensively used yet. However,
several instances of personal injuries from recreational or pri-
vate drone use have been reported.69 For example, a drone that
was carrying a mistletoe as part of TGI Friday’s “Mobile Mistle-
toe” event struck a person with one of its “spinning, uncovered
blades.”70 The accident happened as the drone was trying to
land on the person’s hand.71 In another incident, a woman suf-
fered a serious head injury when a drone that was taking photos
of attendees at a fraternity party “fell on (her) head, causing her
to stumble forward . . . .”72 Her head had “immediately [begun]
to bleed vigorously from her wounds,” and she sustained perma-
nent scars from the accident.73
Similarly, a drone brought to a wedding injured two guests.74
Both guests sued the groom and the event company, “claiming
they suffered permanent physical and emotional injury as a re-
68 See id. § 26.
69 See, e.g., Vanessa Ogle, Drone Strike! Our Photographer Injured by TGI Friday’s
Mistletoe Copter, BROOKLYN PAPER (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.brooklynpaper.com
/drone-strike-our-photographer-injured-by-tgi-fridays-mistletoe-copter/ [https://
perma.cc/5MYR-PSZZ]; California News Wire Services, Woman Struck by Drone at
USC Frat Party Sues Northridge Event Company, PATCH (Sept. 27, 2016, 6:07 PM),
https://patch.com/california/northridge/woman-struck-drone-usc-frat-party-
sues-northridge-event-company [https://perma.cc/2J32-EPRU]; Kiera Blessing,




70 Ogle, supra note 69.
71 Id.
72 California News Wire Services, supra note 69.
73 Id.
74 Blessing, supra note 69.
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sult of the [drone] crash.”75 One of the guests suffered a concus-
sion and needed more than twenty stitches to close the
laceration; the other guest claimed that she “suffered fractured
orbital bones, a fractured nose[,] and a concussion.”76 Even
though the groom was not operating the drone at the time of
the accident, the two guests sued the groom.77 The groom did
not seem concerned with the lawsuit, displaying doubt about
whether the two women would continue with the lawsuit.78 He
said that “[t]he whole thing seem[ed] kind of frivolous.”79
Assuming that drone deliveries become ubiquitous in a few
years, it is not too difficult to envision similar scenarios where
drones themselves or the packages the drones are carrying dam-
age people or property below. The next Part applies negligence
theory to these situations and asserts that the NCCUSL should
propose more specific standards of tort liability arising from de-
livery drones.
C. APPLICATION OF CURRENT NEGLIGENCE JURISPRUDENCE
Imagine the following scenario: a package is being delivered
by a well-known logistics operator on a sunny day. Suddenly, the
drone crashes on the way to its destination, injuring a person
checking their mailbox below. This Section analyzes how the in-
jured person can seek compensation under current negligence
jurisprudence and whether they will be successful in a negli-
gence suit against the logistics operator.
The first issue the plaintiff will encounter is determining who
to sue for negligence. Two likely defendants will be the logistics
operator in charge of delivering the package and the drone pi-
lot. Regardless of who the plaintiff decides to sue, to establish a
prima facie case of negligence, the plaintiff will have to show
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, duty was
breached, and the breach was the actual and proximate cause of






80 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1965); cf.
id. §§ 430–31.
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1. Liable Parties
For a negligence claim arising from injuries from recreational
or private drones, the plaintiff will be able to establish each ele-
ment of negligence more easily. First, the plaintiff would be able
to pinpoint the blame to the drone’s pilot because the pilot was
actually operating the drone. The FAA requires recreational fli-
ers to keep the drone within their visual line of sight or within
another observer’s sight who is physically located next to and
directly interacting with the pilot.81 Furthermore, pilots are gen-
erally barred from flying drones over moving vehicles and peo-
ple, and are directed to “not operate [their] drone[s] in a
dangerous manner.”82 Therefore, the pilot had a duty to at least
exercise reasonable care when flying the drone, and that duty
was breached when the pilot operated the drone improperly,
causing the crash. Actual causation would undoubtedly be estab-
lished because but for the flying of the drone, the harm would
not have resulted. The plaintiff will also be able to argue that
the pilot should have foreseen that such an accident was likely
to occur when he decided to fly the drone in the vicinity of peo-
ple because the drone was supposed to be in the pilot’s visual
line of sight.
On the contrary, the plaintiff suing a commercial drone pilot
would have a difficult time establishing each element of the neg-
ligence claim. Commercial drones are exempt from several re-
quirements that recreational fliers must comply with. For
example, pilots can operate commercial drones beyond their vis-
ual line of sight.83 As such, most pilots would not be in the near
vicinity of where the drones are located, and thus, will likely not
have the same view as a recreational or private drone pilot dur-
ing the entire flight. However, commercial drones are usually
equipped with cameras that provide the necessary visual data to
the pilots.84 In addition, commercial drones are typically con-
81 Recreational Flyers & Modeler Community-Based Organizations, FED. AVIATION AD-
MIN., https://www.faa.gov/uas/recreational_fliers/ [https://perma.cc/99HS-
TMYN] (Sept. 2, 2021, 11:02 AM).
82 Id.; cf. Operations Over People General Overview, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/uas/commercial_operators/operations_over_people/ [https://
perma.cc/8GJS-EK4X] (Apr. 7, 2021, 3:43 PM) (providing the narrow exceptions
when a drone can fly over moving vehicles).
83 See Package Delivery by Drone (Part 135), FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/package_delivery_drone/ [https://
perma.cc/67NQ-Z27N] (Mar. 16, 2021, 3:29 PM).
84 See Commercial Drones: Industries that Use Drones, Deliverables, and Our List of the
Top Models on the Market, FLYABILITY, https://www.flyability.com/commercial-
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trolled from a remote-control room, where the command for
the drone to reach certain GPS coordinates will be program-
med.85 Therefore, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for the
plaintiff to nail down a single pilot for negligence unless they
can obtain such information from the logistics operators
through discovery.
In such cases, the plaintiff may be able to hold the logistics
operator liable under two different causes of action. First, the
logistics operator could be sued under the respondeat superior
doctrine, a type of vicarious liability.86 Under the respondeat su-
perior doctrine, an employer (principal) may be liable for the
negligent actions of its employees (agents) if the tortious act
happened within the employee’s scope of employment.87 To
hold the principal liable for the agent’s torts, not only does the
plaintiff need to show that the agent committed the tort, but he
must also prove that (1) the employer–employee relationship
existed and (2) the act happened within the scope of the em-
ployment.88 The existence of an employer–employee relation-
ship is essential because a principal is not liable for its
independent contractors’ tortious acts.89 The Second Restate-
ment of Agency articulates the differences between an employee
and an independent contractor, which mainly depend on the
principal’s amount of control over the agent’s physical
conduct.90
In a lawsuit against the logistics operator as the principal, it
would be relatively easier for the plaintiff to establish that the
tortious act happened within the scope of the pilot’s employ-
ment with the logistics operator. Assume arguendo that the pi-
lot’s sole responsibility is to input the correct command for the
flight path. If the drone crashed by non-intervening causes—
drones [https://perma.cc/HAQ9-J37X]; Benjamin D. Mathews, Comment, Poten-
tial Tort Liability for Personal Use of Drone Aircraft, 46 ST. MARY’S L.J. 573, 582–83
(2015).
85 See Alberto Cuadra & Craig Whitlock, How Drones Are Controlled, WASH. POST
(June 20, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/
drone-crashes/how-drones-work/ [https://perma.cc/6MM6-XR8C].
86 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
87 E.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 757 (Tex.
2007); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
88 See Mayes, 236 S.W.3d at 757; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 219(1) (AM. L. INST. 1958).
89 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1958).
90 See id. § 220 (listing factors to consider the agent’s status as a “servant,” i.e.,
employee, or as independent contractor).
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i.e., not due to malfunctions of drones, software program error,
or the weather—then the pilot likely put in the incorrect com-
mand, which would be within the scope of his employment.
However, the plaintiff may not be able to show that these pi-
lots are employees of logistics operators. This showing will
largely depend on how the logistics operators contract with their
agents. Even though courts have ruled that the label of either W-
2 employees or 1099 independent contractors is not dispositive
in determining the relationship, the employers are aware of the
factors that the courts use to determine such relationship.91 Em-
ployers would be able to construct contract terms that would
only give them some general control over the pilots but are in-
sufficient to form the employer–employee relationship. For in-
stance, Amazon currently has two different types of drivers with
different terms.92 The first type, becoming an employee of Ama-
zon’s Delivery Service Partners, requires an individual to work
full-time and provides full benefits, opportunities for promo-
tion, and a delivery vehicle.93
On the other hand, Amazon Flex drivers use their own vehi-
cles to deliver packages; get paid in hourly blocks; choose the
block of hours that fit their schedules; and are responsible for
the gas cost, auto insurance, and repairs and maintenance of
their vehicles.94 Applying the Second Restatement of Agency fac-
tors, these Amazon Flex drivers generally seem to fall under the
independent contractor category.95 First, Amazon’s extent of
control over the Amazon Flex drivers appears narrow because
they get to schedule their own blocks of time.96 These drivers
probably also have other distinct occupations or businesses.97
Additionally, picking up packages from the warehouses and de-
91 See, e.g., McKee v. Brimmer, 39 F.3d 94, 98 (5th Cir. 1994) (“In essence, an
employer will not be allowed to escape liability by drafting a contract which labels
its employee an independent contractor, but retains employer-like control over
him.”); Howard W. Luff Co. v. Capece, 61 F.2d 635, 636 (6th Cir. 1932) (“This
court concluded that whether a relationship is one of master and servant, or of
employer and independent contractor, must be determined in each case from
the pertinent facts and circumstances.”).
92 Amazon Delivery Driver, AMAZON, https://hiring.amazon.com/job-opportuni-
ties/delivery-driver-jobs#/ [https://perma.cc/BE9L-GGHT]; Amazon Flex Delivery
Driver, AMAZON, https://hiring.amazon.com/job-opportunities/flex-driver-jobs#/
[https://perma.cc/RS3F-8XZD].
93 Amazon Delivery Driver, supra note 92.
94 Amazon Flex Delivery Driver, supra note 92.
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (AM. L. INST. 1958).
96 Id. § 220(2)(a).
97 Id. § 220(2)(b).
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livering them is customarily done without much supervision,
and not much skill is required apart from the ability to drive.98
Second, the drivers use their own cars, and therefore, Amazon
does not supply “the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of
work for the person doing the work.”99 Third, Amazon pays the
drivers by the time worked rather than by the job.100 Lastly, ab-
sent specific contract terms, it is hard to determine whether Am-
azon and Flex drivers believed they were creating an
employment relationship.101 However, based on the limited facts
and generalizations provided above, it appears that they did not
intend to create such permanent relationships. The only factors
that lean towards finding an employer–employee relationship
are that Amazon is in the logistics business, and the drivers’
work is part of its regular business.102
Relatedly, Amazon has subcontracted with delivery companies
to provide shipping services.103 Even though “those ubiquitous
gray-blue vans and uniformed drivers all have Amazon branding
on them,” there are at least 250 subcontracted companies that
do the heavy lifting.104 The drivers of these subcontracted com-
panies would not be considered Amazon’s employees, and thus,
Amazon would likely not be held liable for these drivers’ torts.
Injured parties could argue that Amazon was the principal, the
subcontractor was the agent, and the driver was an agent of the
agent, but this may make it more challenging to show an em-
ployer–employee relationship because the principal is one step
removed from the tortfeasor. So, even if the FAA requires all
commercial drone pilots to be licensed and more heavily regu-
lated, it seems likely that logistic operators will continue to use
subcontractors. The Amazon-branded cars “deliver about half of
all the company’s last-mile shipments,”105 which would likely be
the shipments picked up by the commercial drones (if they
meet the weight requirement). Hence, with the increasing prev-
98 Id. § 220(2)(c)–(d).
99 Id. § 220(2)(e).
100 Id. § 220(2)(g).
101 Id. § 220(2)(i).
102 See id. § 220(h), (j).
103 See Kate Cox, Amazon Delivery Contractors Operate with Little Oversight, Report
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alence of the “gig economy”106 and the uses of subcontractors,
the plaintiff will have a hard time establishing that the pilot who
operated the injury-causing commercial drone was an employee
of the logistics operator.
Another way to hold a logistics operator liable is to sue for its
direct negligence. As a principal, the logistics operator could be
negligent in failing to supervise its employees adequately, pro-
vide sufficient instructions, or hire competent or suitable people
to fly the drones.107 However, these are business decisions, and
courts usually apply high deference standards to such deci-
sions.108 Therefore, the plaintiff likely will not succeed in seek-
ing compensation.
2. Duty and Breach
Even if the plaintiff can point out the pilot who was associated
with the particular commercial drone that caused the injury, it is
unclear what duty a particular pilot would owe to the plaintiff.
The lowest, yet reasonable, duty would be for the pilot to input
the GPS coordinates of the package’s destination correctly. After
all, commercial drones are uncrewed, automated aircraft.109
With the ability to detect obstacles and avoid collisions, they are
expected to fly by themselves once the pilot has inserted the
correct command.110 For example, Amazon’s delivery drone
called the Prime Air drone features “an automated drone man-
agement system” and “carries a ‘diversity of sen-
sors’ . . . including visual, thermal, and ultrasonic, in order to
106 “The gig economy in total accounts for the world’s second-highest number
of work opportunities. To put this in perspective, a third of the world’s workers
are employed within this economy, with transactions looking to rise from $204
billion to $455 billion in 2023.” Richard Fang, The Gig Economy Is Growing and Why
the Tech Industry Is Loving It, MEDIUM (Nov. 22, 2020), https://medium.com/
swlh/the-gig-economy-is-growing-and-why-the-tech-industry-is-loving-it-
6f890ee0be4a [https://perma.cc/FG77-27L4].
107 See generally DON MAYER, DANIEL M. WARNER, GEORGE J. SIEDEL, JETHRO K.
LIEBERMAN & ALYSSA ROSE MARTINA, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT AND BUSINESS LAW
505 (Executive MBA ed. 2012), https://app.livecarta.com/catalog/preview/the-
legal-environment-and-business-law [https://perma.cc/7BAW-X5C6].
108 See, e.g., Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court in & for County of
Clark, 399 P.3d 334, 341-42 (Nev. 2017).
109 See Fintan Corrigan, How Do Drones Work and What Is Drone Technology,
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feed data to a sophisticated sense-and-avoid system.”111 The
drone should be able to detect “people, dogs, and even a slen-
der clothesline from the air,” resulting in “safe, predictable be-
havior in every situation.”112
Despite such an automated system, one may propose that the
pilot should have the duty to pay attention to the surroundings
of the drone during its entire flight via the camera to make sure
that nothing goes wrong. When a similar question was asked in
the context of automated vehicles, one author proposed that if a
reasonable user of the automated car understands the manufac-
turer’s instructions “to mean that the driver can choose to not
pay attention, it seems inequitable to then hold her liable for
negligence for anything that happens after that, barring any
user misuse of intervening cause of plaintiff’s injury.”113 As com-
mercial drone pilots will not be actively controlling the flight
paths of these drones, it also seems unfair to impose on the pi-
lots the duty to oversee flight paths of every single package be-
ing delivered from start to finish. Additionally, as drone
deliveries become more common, it may be impossible for pilots
to meet the ordinary standard of care—let alone the heightened
standard that usually applies to pilots114—simply due to the
sheer number of deliveries per day. For instance, in July 2020,
Amazon shipped 415 million packages.115 “Amazon [said] that
86% of its packages weigh less than five pounds,”116 which is the
maximum weight that its drones can carry.117 Similarly, UPS saw
volume growth of 26% that same month while “FedEx volume
111 Miriam McNabb, See Amazon’s New Delivery Drone Fly: Will Your Stuff Be Deliv-




113 Orly Ravid, Comment, Don’t Sue Me, I Was Just Lawfully Texting & Drunk
When My Autonomous Car Crashed Into You, 44 SW. L. REV. 175, 198 (2014).
114 See Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979)
(holding defendant to a minimum standard of care for pilots rather than for
ordinary persons).
115 Frank Holland, Amazon Is Delivering Nearly Two-Thirds of Its Own Packages as
E-Commerce Continues Pandemic Boom, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2020, 3:59 PM), https://
www.cnbc.com/2020/08/13/amazon-is-delivering-nearly-two-thirds-of-its-own-
packages.html [https://perma.cc/RF2X-UUY7].
116 Josh Dunham, Drones: An In-Depth Guide to Success, REVEEL (May 22, 2019),
https://www.reveelgroup.com/drones-an-in-depth-guide-to-success/ [https://
perma.cc/XC5L-T8UD].
117 Frederic Lardinois, A First Look at Amazon’s New Delivery Drone, TECHCRUNCH
(June 5, 2019, 11:59 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/05/a-first-look-at-
amazons-new-delivery-drone/ [https://perma.cc/C3YD-EHAG].
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rose 22%.”118 Therefore, once commercial delivery drones are
fully incorporated, one can only imagine how many deliveries
will be made per day across the nation.119
Regardless of whichever duty is imposed, the plaintiff will
likely not be able to show that such duty was breached by either
the pilot or the logistics operator. Applying Judge Hand’s
formula, the burden imposed on either defendant would be
higher than the probability of the harm occurring multiplied by
the gravity of the resulting injury.120 The pilot would have a sig-
nificant burden, as discussed above, especially if the pilot is ex-
pected to oversee the entire flight path of each package.
Alternatively, if the pilot only has the duty to take reasonable
care to input the correct commands, then unless the wrong co-
ordination proximately caused the drone to crash into the plain-
tiff, there would be no breach.
Similarly, for the logistics operators, courts would not likely
find that a breach has occurred. To be compliant with the FAA’s
regulations, the logistics operators would have already taken sig-
nificant precautionary measures. They would have performed
several pilot programs;121 hired licensed pilots and provided
training;122 limited weight of packages; and installed required
safety and security features, such as cameras, anti-collision lights
visible from three miles away, and remote identification technol-
ogy.123 On the other hand, the probability of harm occurring
would be relatively low, with the probability decreasing as the
harm becomes more grievous.
Applying the risk-utility test of the Second Restatement of
Torts results in a similar conclusion.124 The Restatement states
that the “risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk
is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the
utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is
118 Holland, supra note 115.
119 “A 2017 industry report predicted that demand for urban freight delivery
[will] grow 40% by 2050.” Dunham, supra note 116.
120 See discussion supra Section III.A.
121 See Jaclyn Diaz, U.S. Announces New Rules for Drones and Their Operators, NPR
(Dec. 29, 2020, 3:54 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/12/29/951010863/u-s-an-
nounces-new-rules-for-drones-and-their-operators [https://perma.cc/9VLZ-
Z6EW] (reporting that Walmart conducted a pilot program and Amazon is still
testing its services even after receiving FAA approval).
122 See id.
123 See id.
124 See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291–93 (AM. L. INST.
1965) (listing factors to determine both utility and magnitude of risk).
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done.”125 Some of the factors in determining the utility of the
actor’s conduct are as follows: the social value of the interest to
be advanced, the “extent of the chance that this interest will be
advanced or protected by the particular course of conduct,” and
the availability of less dangerous alternatives.126 Like automated
vehicles, the social value promoted by commercial drones is effi-
cient and faster delivery with potentially fewer accidents because
drone deliveries will reduce the number of deliveries by human-
driven automobiles.127 On the other hand, factors used to deter-
mine the magnitude of the risk include the social value of the
interest imperiled, the likelihood that the “actor’s conduct will
cause an invasion of any interest of the other,” the grievousness
of the harm, and the “number of persons whose interests are
likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect in harm.”128 Commer-
cial drones imperil several other interests, such as privacy rights,
which go beyond the scope of this Comment.129 However, per-
sonal injury and property damages are expected to decrease
with automated commercial drones. In other words, the number
of persons who commercial drones will harm compared to those
who will benefit from the incorporation of commercial drones
will be lower.
Therefore, even without addressing the proximate causation
element, the negligence theory of liability will likely not be an
effective cause of action for the injured parties seeking compen-
sation for damages from the pilots or the logistics operators.
Professor Gary Marchant and Rachel Lindor, Directors of the
Center for Law, Science & Innovation at the Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law, posed a similar question as this Com-
ment for autonomous vehicles.130 Dividing the autonomous ve-
hicles into two categories—partially and completely
autonomous vehicles—they hypothesized that
“partial autonomous systems will shift some . . . of the responsibil-
ity for accident avoidance from the driver to the vehicle. . . . With
125 Id. § 291.
126 Id. § 292.
127 See Jensen, supra note 46, at 584.
128 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 293 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
129 See, e.g., Watson, supra note 12, at 1400 (arguing that adopting a per se
aerial trespass rule would be premature and economically disadvantageous);
Carlton, supra note 12, at 2137–38 (arguing that property owners’ privacy and
property rights should be protected against drones through comprehensive fed-
eral regulation); Cash, supra note 12, at 698–99 (stating that current tort law is
adequate to protect privacy rights in the context of drones).
130 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 46, at 1326–30.
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a fully autonomous vehicle, however, the responsibility for avoid-
ing an accident shifts entirely to the vehicle and the components
of its accident avoidance systems.”131
Consequently, they stated that the person who is more likely
to be held liable would be the vehicle manufacturers or other
producers of components of these vehicles under the products
liability theory rather than the drivers under the negligence the-
ory.132 Similarly, parties injured by commercial drones will have
a better chance of recovery under other theories of liability such
as strict liability, products liability, and negligence per se doc-
trines. The following Section proposes recommendations for al-
ternative recovery options instead of the negligence tort theory.
IV. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS
This Section first proposes that the NCCUSL should adopt its
earlier version of the Drones Act. Then, the current jurispru-
dence of different liability theories is discussed and applied in
the context of commercial drones.
A. TORT LAW RELATING TO DRONES ACT
As mentioned above in Section II.B, the NCCUSL included a
separate section specific to negligence liability in the earlier
draft of its Drones Act. It stated that an operator is negligent “if
the operator does not exercise reasonable care under all of the
circumstances.”133 Furthermore, it identified the standard of
care applicable to the operator as “the standard of care of a simi-
larly situated operator of an [uncrewed] aircraft, including
whether the operator is a commercial or hobbyist operator and
whether the operator is required by the [FAA] or other author-
ity to hold a license for the operation of the [uncrewed] air-
craft.”134 Despite its brevity, it clarifies the duty that operators
owe to the injured parties. This standard of care is broad and
rather indefinite, but at least it specifies that the heightened
standard of care laid out in Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc. should be
applied.135 Consequently, the NCCUSL should reincorporate
this section into the Drones Act.
131 Id. at 1326.
132 Id. at 1327–28.
133 TORT L. RELATING TO DRONES ACT § 9(a) (UNIF. L. COMM’N., Draft Feb. 19,
2019).
134 Id. § 9(b).
135 See Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
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Further, the NCCUSL should define “operators”—whether
they are the pilots operating the commercial drones or the own-
ers of the commercial drones, namely the logistics operators.
Professor Nanci Carr, Business Law Professor at California State
University in Northridge, proposed that one way the owners of
automated systems could be assigned liability is to treat “the car
[as] the electronic agent of the owner.”136 She supported this
proposition by stating that Congress lent some support for the
agency theory because “it [had] previously passed legislation
clarifying that individuals can be held to contracts entered into
by their electronic agents.”137 If such legislation were to apply to
automated vehicles, the same agency theory could likely extend
to commercial drones.
B. STRICT LIABILITY
Generally, strict liability applies in two distinct situations:
maintaining custody of livestock or wild animals and conducting
abnormally dangerous activities.138 An owner of a wild animal,
even if the animal is domesticated, is strictly liable for harm
caused by the animal, even if the owner was not aware of the
danger.139 Similarly, an injuring party would be liable under
strict liability claims if the conduct is qualified as an abnormally
dangerous activity, even if the injured party used the utmost
care.140 An activity is abnormally dangerous if it creates a “fore-
seeable and highly significant risk of physical harm” regardless
of whether actors exercise reasonable care and the activity is not
of “common usage.”141 The Second Restatement of Torts also
considers the appropriateness of the activity to the location it is
136 Nanci K. Carr, As the Role of the Driver Changes with Autonomous Vehicle Tech-
nology, so, Too, Must the Law Change, 51 ST. MARY’S L.J. 817, 840 (2020).
137 Id. at 839 & n.138 (“A contract or other record relating to a transaction in
or affecting interstate or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, valid-
ity, or enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved
the action of one or more electronic agents so long as the action of any such
electronic agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.”) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 7001(h)).
138 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 24 (AM. L. INST. 2010).
139 Id. § 22–23 (subjecting to strict liability an owner or possessor of a wild
animal or of an animal which the owner or possessor “knows or has reason to
know” has dangerous tendencies).
140 See id. § 20(a), (b)(1); see also id. § 20 cmts. g, h; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 519(1) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
141 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 20(b) (AM. L. INST. 2010); cf. Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 96 S.W.2d 221, 226
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carried out at and the activity’s value to the community.142 Ex-
amples of abnormally dangerous activities include those involv-
ing explosives and nuclear waste. The common ground between
these two categories—wild animals and abnormally dangerous
activities—is that both exhibit inherent risks of dangers that
could result in serious harm.
Legislatures should, at least temporarily, include commercial
drones as another category that will hold owners and operators
strictly liable for harm caused by commercial drones. Until com-
mercial drones become fully incorporated, drone delivery will
not be considered a “natural or necessary and common use” of
the device.143 Furthermore, delivery by commercial drones cre-
ates a foreseeable and significant risk of physical harm despite
the reasonable precautions taken by the logistics operators to
comply with the FAA regulations. Although the accidents may
be infrequent due to technological advances,144 the resulting
harm could be significant because these drones could drop
from 400 feet above the ground at a maximum speed of 100
mph.145 As noted in the next paragraph, similar reasonings were
used to propose strict liability for harms caused by an airplane
“if anything [went] wrong with the flight.”146
As Michael Spanel noted, “[crewed] aircraft were considered
abnormally dangerous in the infancy of experimental commer-
cial flight.”147 The Second Restatement of Torts specifically dedi-
cates a section to state that both the operator and the owner of
(Tex. 1936) (contrasting common use of land between England and Texas to
determine application of a negligence rule).
142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520(e), (f) (AM. L. INST. 1977).
143 Turner, 96 S.W.2d at 226 (explaining that a landowner’s responsibility for
damages was related to whether the use of the land was natural or common for
the area).
144 See Malek Murison, What Are the Most Common Causes for Drone Crashes?,
DRONEBASE, https://blog.dronebase.com/2017/11/20/what-are-the-most-com-
mon-causes-of-drone-crashes [https://perma.cc/FE5E-82Q7] (Feb. 18, 2020)
(noting that, at least for recreational drones, “the causes of [crashes] have shifted
towards pilot error rather than a genuine technology fault.”).
145 Press Release, Fed. Aviation Admin., Fact Sheet – Small Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) Regulations (Part 107) (Oct. 6, 2020), https://www.faa.gov/
news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=22615 [https://perma.cc/DW3K-
W3KS].
146 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977)
(Ground Damage from Aircraft).
147 Michael Spanel, Liability and Allocation of Liability in Drone Accidents, Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law Aviation Law Seminar, at 5 (May 15, 2015), http://
www.kentlaw.edu/perritt/courses/seminar/Michael%20Spanel%20-%20Fi-
nal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TFF-CYQC].
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the aircraft—the one who “authorized or permitted the opera-
tion”—are subject to strict liability for any “physical harm to
land or to persons or chattels on the ground” that is caused “by
the dropping or falling of an object from the aircraft.”148 Com-
ment c to § 520A of the Second Restatement of Torts further
explains that such a position was necessary because “aviation
ha[d] not yet reached the stage of development” to properly
allocate the risks of accidental physical harm to the injured par-
ties or to the industry itself.149 The authors of the Restatement
recognized that “while the safety record [wa]s greatly im-
proved[,] it still [could not] be said that the danger of ground
damage ha[d] been so eliminated or reduced that the ordinary
rules of negligence law should be applied.”150 They added that
people on the ground had “no place to hide from falling air-
craft” and were “helpless to select any locality for their residence
or business in which they will not be exposed to the risk, how-
ever minimized it may be.”151 The same rationale applies to
commercial drones. Even though smaller in size, commercial
drones create the same risk of harm to people and property on
the ground. If people were staring at the sky when the delivery
drones are falling, then they might be able to react quickly
enough to find coverings or step aside to avoid a direct collision.
However, their property on the ground, whether movable or im-
movable, would be unable to avoid such harm.
Additionally, there are only limited precautions people on the
ground can take. Professors Robert Cooter of the University of
California at Berkeley and Thomas Ulen of the University of Illi-
nois, Urbana-Champaign, consider different theories of liability
and each theory’s effect on creating incentives to take efficient
precautions.152 One of their conclusions is that “[i]f only the [in-
jured party] can take precaution, then a rule of no liability pro-
vides incentives for efficient precaution.”153 A rule of no liability
is where injured parties bear the entire risk of harm.154 The total
cost for an injured party is the cost of harm and the cost of pre-
148 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (AM. L. INST. 1977).
149 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 199–201 (6th ed.
2016) (defining the efficient level of precaution as a point where marginal social
cost is equal to the marginal social benefit).
153 Id. at 204.
154 See id. at 202.
460 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [86
caution. Because injured parties have incentives to minimize the
total cost they bear, they will be motivated to take precautions
until the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit.155
On the other hand, “[i]f only the injurer can take precaution,
then a rule of strict liability with perfect compensation provides
incentives for efficient precaution.”156 This is because, under
strict liability, injured parties are “indifferent between an acci-
dent with [perfect] compensation and no accident.”157 They
have no incentive to take precaution because their total cost
under strict liability would only be the cost of precaution since
the injuring party would always cover the cost of harm.158 As
such, to minimize their total cost, they would not take any pre-
cautions. On the contrary, the injuring parties would take effi-
cient precautions to ensure the marginal cost is equal to the
marginal benefit to minimize their total costs or the sum of costs
on precautions taken and the costs of harm caused.159
In the context of commercial drones, logistic operators have
numerous reasonable precautions they can take to reduce the
risk of accidents happening. For instance, they can hire quali-
fied pilots, implement training systems and other protocols to
maintain the quality of their operations, and comply with safety
regulations and laws enacted by the FAA and state legislatures.
However, people on the ground have limited numbers of rea-
sonable precautions, if at all. Therefore, until commercial
drones become ubiquitous and the law specific to commercial
drones is well-developed, delivery by drones should be catego-
rized as an abnormally dangerous activity under the Third Re-
statement of Torts.
Critics of this proposal would point out that it may unduly
burden logistics operators and inhibit their incentives to adopt
this new mechanism. However, this may be a fairer approach in
the end because logistics operators would be in a better position
to absolve such costs and distribute them among their consum-
ers. Consumers would be opposed to the idea of increased costs
when using logistics operators’ services, but practically, such an
increase would be minimal when spread among millions of con-
155 Id.
156 Id. at 204.
157 Id. at 203. Professors Cooter and Ulen suggest we “assume that the damages
compensate the victim perfectly” as a useful analytic tool even while acknowledg-
ing this assumption is unrealistic. Id.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 203–04.
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sumers. As such, the potential costs of litigation under a negli-
gence cause of action would likely be greater than the sum of
litigation costs under a strict liability cause of action and the
minimally increased upfront costs due to a longer litigation pe-
riod and a more robust discovery phase.
Furthermore, applying strict liability would better serve the
purposes of tort law, which is to deter avoidable accidents and
compensate victims.160 Knowing that they will be strictly liable,
the logistics operators would be incentivized to take more pre-
cautions, resulting in fewer accidents. Additionally, as seen
above in the application of current negligence tort law, it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for the injured parties to establish
negligence and hold the injuring parties liable. As such, some
parties at fault, such as owners and operators, may escape liabil-
ity. However, injured parties would still need to show causation
(both actual and proximate) and damages, removing potentially
frivolous claims. Lastly, application of strict liability may save liti-
gation costs for both parties by shortening the litigation period
and encouraging settlement of lawsuits.161 Strict liability can also
lead to a reduction in administrative costs because the “courts
need not determine what level of care should be required of
defendants nor whether defendants have met the prescribed
level of care.”162
C. NEGLIGENCE PER SE
Negligence per se doctrine holds that the violation of a statute
is negligence as a matter of law.163 The statute in question deter-
mines the standard of care, and the jury is left to determine
whether (1) the statute was violated without a valid excuse, (2)
the injured party was part of the class that the statute intended
to protect, and (3) such violation both factually and legally
caused the harm that the statute was protecting against.164
160 Carr, supra note 136, at 838.




163 See Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815–16 (N.Y. 1920); see also Paul Yowell,
Judicial Discretion in Adopting Legislative Standards: Texas’s Solution to the Problem of
Negligence Per Se?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 109, 110 (1997).
164 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 14 (AM. L. INST. 2010) (“An actor is negligent if, without excuse, the actor vio-
lates a statute that is designed to protect against the type of accident the actor’s
conduct causes, and if the accident victim is within the class of persons the statute
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There are different approaches to violations of statutes de-
pending on the jurisdiction.165 Some states hold that the viola-
tion of a statute creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence
which means that the injuring party may rebut by showing that a
reasonable person would have acted as he did.166 Other jurisdic-
tions hold that violations of safety statutes are merely evidence
of negligence.167 Regardless of these different approaches, the
important element of this doctrine is that it removes considera-
tions of the reasonableness of the injuring party’s actions from
the jury; instead, “the statute establishes the standard of care.”168
Negligence per se doctrine is also a more viable alternative
than the negligence tort theory because it removes courts’ bur-
den to determine the reasonable standard of care in different
circumstances and plaintiffs’ burden in establishing a breach of
that duty. For instance, suppose a drone is delivering a package
in heavy rain for the last segment of the delivery. The pilot coor-
dinated the correct destination coordinates, and there is no
problem with the drone itself. Because of the heavy rain, the
package gets soaked even though it is waterproof, slips from the
drone, falls on a parked car’s front window, and significantly
damages the car. Under the ordinary negligence cause of ac-
tion, the plaintiff likely would not successfully recover from the
logistics operator. First, the plaintiff may not even bring a law-
suit because litigation costs would probably be greater than the
cost of repairing the car himself. Second, the plaintiff’s main
argument would be that the logistics operator was negligent in
delivering the package in heavy rain. However, a significant
counterargument would be that the logistics operator also took
precautionary measures. Namely, the logistics operator water-
proofed the package, and the drone was only used in the last
segment of the delivery, meaning it was not in the rain for an
extended period. Therefore, one court may rule that the stan-
dard of care used by the logistics operator was reasonable and
that there was no breach, but another court may rule the other
way.
is designed to protect.”); see also Yowell, supra note 163, at 111 (explaining courts
generally apply doctrine to statutes intended to protect the plaintiff from the
particular harm suffered).
165 See Yowell, supra note 163, at 111.
166 See, e.g., Sheehan v. Nims, 75 F.2d 293, 294 (2d Cir. 1935).
167 See, e.g., Gill v. Whiteside-Hemby Drug Co., 122 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Ark.
1938).
168 Yowell, supra note 163, at 110–11.
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However, suppose the FAA proposed a safety regulation
prohibiting drone deliveries in bad weather—thunderstorms,
heavy snows, high wind velocity, etc.—and state legislatures have
adopted the regulation. In cases where harms occur because of
bad weather and such a statute is in place, logistics operators
would be held liable under the negligence per se doctrine if the
injured party can show causation (both actual and proximate)
and injury. Such a regulation would provide uniformity among
different courts and better serve the purpose of tort law as plain-
tiffs will more likely be compensated.
Critics of this proposal would likely argue that this may unduly
burden the FAA or state legislatures, wasting their limited re-
sources on creating numerous laws that will be used in limited
circumstances. Critics will likely also argue that it would be im-
possible for these lawmakers to foresee every possible scenario
that may result in personal injury or property damage from neg-
ligent use or maloperations of commercial drones. However,
even if these laws are limited specifically to commercial drones,
such laws will provide clear ex ante guidance to logistics opera-
tors delivering millions of packages a month.169 The law might
be applied narrowly, but its impact will be broad. Furthermore,
having clear rules to follow will likely reduce the number of acci-
dents, decreasing the potential number of lawsuits. Therefore,
the FAA or legislatures should enact more safety regulations and
statutes to address when operations of commercial drones are
permitted.
D. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Another cause of action available to the injured party is prod-
ucts liability, which makes sellers or distributors of defective
products liable for the harm caused by the defect.170 There are
three types of products liability defects: manufacturing defects,
design defects, and defects due to inadequate instructions or
warnings.171 A manufacturing defect exists “when the product
departs from its intended design even though all possible care
was exercised in the preparation and marketing of the prod-
uct.”172 A product has a defect in design when there is a reasona-
169 See Holland, supra note 115 (stating that Amazon shipped 415 million pack-
ages in July 2020).
170 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 (AM. L. INST. 1998).
171 Id. § 2.
172 Id. § 2(a).
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ble alternative design that could have been adopted to reduce
or avoid the “foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product,”
and the “omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe.”173 For design defect claims, courts typically
apply the “risk-utility” test, where the courts consider the weight
of various factors such as the utility of the product, available sub-
stitutes, and the risk of harm.174 Another test that some courts
apply is the “consumer expectation test,” which “inquires what
level of safety a reasonable consumer would expect from the
product in question.”175 In other words, if the product fails to
meet the consumer’s expectation, then the product is deemed
unreasonably dangerous. The Third Restatement of Torts re-
jects this approach and states that the consumer expectation test
is not a separate, independent test, but an influential or even
determinative part of the risk-utility test.176
Lastly, inadequate instructions or warnings can result in a
product being defective when foreseeable risks of harm exist
that could have been reduced or avoided by supplying reasona-
ble instructions or warnings.177 The omission of such informa-
tion makes the product not reasonably safe.178 However, there is
no duty to warn against obvious risks of harm.179 The rationale is
that the “obviousness of the danger is the surrogate for a warn-
ing and warnings about obvious and well known risks diminish
the significance of warnings and tend to clutter warning labels
with useless information.”180
Until the FAA, state legislators, or the courts establish clearer
standards, injured parties with bodily harm or property damages
should seek compensation under the products liability cause of
action. Jacob D. Walpert argued that manufacturers of a fully
automated car should be held liable even if they were not di-
rectly involved in the crash “because the ‘driver’ is a computer
system incapable of negligence under traditional common law
173 Id. § 2(b).
174 Jensen, supra note 46, at 592.
175 Marchant & Lindor, supra note 46, at 1324.
176 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. g (AM. L. INST.
1998).
177 Id. § 2 cmt. i.
178 Id.
179 Id. § 2 cmt. j.
180 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Products Liability Restate-
ment in the Courts: An Initial Assessment, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 7, 16 (2000).
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and statutory formulations of due care.”181 Thus, the concept of
computer systems being incapable of negligence should be ex-
tended to commercial drones to justify a claim under products
liability.182
V. CURRENTLY AVAILABLE PROTECTIONS FOR
LOGISTICS OPERATORS
The previous Section proposed that logistics operators should
be strictly liable for harm caused by delivery drones. Logistics
operators may view such a proposal as increasing their burden,
which may eventually outweigh their potential profits. However,
as previously noted, strict liability is beneficial to both parties.
Knowing that they are strictly liable, logistics operators could
distribute potential costs to their consumers. Alternatively, with
a products liability cause of action, commercial drone manufac-
turers will also be incentivized to produce higher quality prod-
ucts with fewer defects. Hence, the number of accidents will be
reduced.
Further, damaging a drone violates federal law and can result
in a fine or imprisonment of up to twenty years.183 Therefore,
the logistics operators will not have to worry about their drones
getting damaged by people on the ground who have negative
feelings toward commercial drones. Furthermore, even though
the FAA stated that it had no authority to “mandate the
purchase of liability insurance,” it recommended that
“[p]rudent remote pilots should evaluate their existing insur-
ance policies to determine whether they have appropriate cover-
age.”184 “[T]he property casualty insurance industry is
responding to the rise in drone use” because of the increased
exposure to new risks.185 As such, logistics operators may be able
181 Jacob D. Walpert, Note, Carpooling Liability?: Applying Tort Law Principles to
the Joint Emergence of Self-Driving Automobiles and Transportation Network Companies,
85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1863, 1894–95 (2017).
182 Cf. McNabb, supra note 111 (drones will likely be equipped with a fully
automated management system along with a “sophisticated sense-and-avoid
system”).
183 18 U.S.C. § 32(a); see also John Goglia, FAA Confirms Shooting A Drone Is A




184 Final Rule, supra note 28, at 4365.
185 Sehrawat, supra note 13, at 130; see also Michael S. Levine & Jorge R. Aviles,
As Amazon’s and Walmart’s Drones Take to the Skies, It is Important for Commercial
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to obtain insurance plans that cover products liability, personal
injury, and property damages.186
VI. CONCLUSION
With advancing technology and the FAA’s active involvement
in commercial drones, delivery drones will become ubiquitous
in the near future. However, the current negligence theory pro-
vides unclear guidance as to whom the liabilities should be allo-
cated in cases of personal injury or property damages caused by
acts of nature, negligent operations, or malfunctions of com-
mercial drones. Under the current negligence theory, the in-
jured parties will not likely recover from either the logistics
operator or the pilots. Alternate liability theories, such as strict
liability, negligence per se, or products liability, appear to be
more viable options for the injured parties with additional ac-
tions from the legislatures and the FAA. Ultimately, NCCUSL
should reincorporate its earlier draft of the Drones Act, which at
least provided a section on standards of duty that operators of
commercial drones would owe to the injured parties. It is pru-
dent that the FAA, state legislators, and courts establish clearer
standards and recovery methods for those injured by drones.
Policyholders to Have a Strategy to Protect Against Drone-Related Risks and to Maximize
their Recovery in the Event of a Loss, HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH: HUNTON INS. RECOV-





186 See Sehrawat, supra note 13, at 131.
